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Abstract:  The  formula  for  the  “unconditional  surrender”  adopted  in 
Casablanca on the 24
th of January 1943 was meant to acquaint the governments of 
the states at war with the United Nations with the treatment and the terms of their 
countries would have to take, no matter when or why they might withdraw. 
  As far as Romania was concerned, the terms of surrender included, among 
others, demobilisation and disarmament, handing over war materials, amends etc, 
all of which were to be imposed on by the three great powers and had been thought 
mainly to secure safety and to carrying on the warfare against Germany. These 
objectives were considered to have deep political implications.  
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The Truce Convention concluded by Romania, on the one hand, and the 
United  Nations,  on  the  other  hand,  was  not  the  document  that  the  Romanian 
opposition and the authorities had been waiting for during the secret negotiation in 
Cairo, Ankara or Stockholm. The formula for “unconditional surrender” adopted in 
Casablanca on the 24
th of January 1943 was meant to acquaint the governments of 
the states at war with the United Nations with the treatment and the terms their 
countries would have to take, no matter when or why they might withdraw. 
  As far as Romania was concerned, the terms of surrender included, among 
others, demobilisation and disarmament, handing over war materials, amends etc, all 
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mainly  to  secure  safety  and  a  carrying  on  of  warfare  against  Germany.  These 
objectives were considered to have deep political implications
1. 
  In the first few days right after the blow at the palace on the 23
rd of August 
and  after  changing  sides  and  turning  against  Germany,  Romania’s  international 
political standpoint was that of an independent state waging war against its former 
allies and siding with its former enemies, part of its territory being seized from a 
military point of view. On entering Bucharest, the Soviet army was to find here an 
independent government which was both able and willing to conclude the truce and 
could easily take pride in having drawn upon its own resources to neutralise German 
troops and to set free a significant part of the national territory
2. If the Soviets had, 
by any chance, made different plans
3 for Romania
4, they were to be overthrown by 
king Mihai who had managed to change the course of history by having the marshal 
arrested.  What  the  new  Romanian  authorities  intended  to  do  was  to  sign  an 
agreement with the United Nations as soon as possible in order to prevent the Red 
army from taking military control of the whole country. 
  The assignment of the new government was all the more pressing as the 
Soviet armies, particularly their leading bodies, used to regard the country as if the 
territory had been occupied through fighting. Initially, the Soviets also wanted the 
truce  to  be concluded  as soon  as  possible,  for they  were  aware  of  the  strategic 
advantage represented by the direct threat on Hungary in what was to be known as 
the most important movement of front translation in the history of World War II. 
Subsequently, the situation would change: Russian troops having already occupied 
the whole Romanian territory and the Soviet government becoming aware of the 
                                                            
1 August 23
rd 1944. Documents, vol 1, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, pp. 66-
70. 
2 Official news released by the Soviet army mentioned fighting to set whole regions free, 
including  the  capital  city,  thus  taking  credit  for  something  which  had  already  been 
accomplished by the Romanian troops. It is also true that after Anglo-American allies had set 
Paris free, the Russians tried to impress by the liberation of Bucharest.  
3 The scenario of taking control of Central and South-Eastern European countries was, to a 
great extent, similar in all countries that had been set free by the Red army. They would have 
to accept the coming to power of communist parties supported by the Soviet  
Union.  Further  reference,  Sperlea,  Florin,  Aparatul  politic  în  armatele  ţărilor  Europei 
Centrale şi de Sud-Est (1944-1947), R.I.M no 1/41-1997, p. 47. 
4 Establishing groups of volunteers, the constant involvement of the Moscow representatives 
of  the  Communist  Party  in  Romania  and  the  existence  of  the  volunteer  division  “Tudor 
Vladimirescu” were enough to suggest what the true intentions of the Soviets were. The 
Soviet Union was taken aback by this move; they would now have to take the longer path 
and rely on the terms of the Truce Convention to make Romania a Communist country. ŒCONOMICA 
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advantages that military control over Romania, the Soviets would no longer rush 
towards concluding the truce. 
  At the basis of the truce were actually the terms offered to Romania in April 
and  reiterated  on  the  25
th  of  August  in  the  statement  made  by  Molotov,  the 
commissary in charge with foreign affairs on behalf of the Soviet Union. These 
terms were to be discussed in Moscow, where the Soviets would have a great say 
during negotiation with the Romanian representatives
1. 
  Shortly after the 23
rd of August, the representatives of the United States, 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union would make haste in the matter of concluding 
and signing the truce based on the text that had already been approved of in April 
1944
2. The negotiation asked for further explanatory notes and annotations in the 
draft Truce Convention
3, that is why the final text was not concluded and made 
known to the Romanian party until the 10
th of September 1944. 
  The Romanian authorities would go to great lengths to conclude the Truce; 
to this purpose, they sent to Moscow a group made of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Ghiţă 
Pop, Dumitru Dămăceanu, Ion Christu, who were all specialists in economic matters 
and  international  law.  Unfortunately,  the  talks  carried  out  in  Moscow  by 
representatives of the Romanian government and representatives of the Allies did 
not touch upon negotiating the suggested terms, despite the fact that the Romanian 
party did object to several aspects; most of their objections were overlooked by the 
Soviet Premier V. Molotov who was the chief negotiator of the Allies. 
  Despite the Soviet refusal to grant any favours, the Anglo-Americans would 
come to the conclusion that the Romanians headed back home feeling that they had 
got off cheap; what they found to be of greater importance was the way in which the 
Soviets would interpret and bring into operation the truce terms. The application 
practice to the Truce Convention signed on the 12
th of September 1944 would only 
prove that the concern voiced by the Romanian group was only rightful; up to that 
                                                            
1 Ibidem. The negotiation in which the British, the Russians and the Americans participated 
took longer than expected, as the allies had difficulty agreeing upon certain provisions of the 
Truce Convention 
2  Mihai,  Bărbulescu,  Dennis,  Deletant,  Keith,  Hitchins,  Serban,  Papacostea,  Pompiliu, 
Teodor, Istoria României (The History of Romania), Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 1999, 
p. 469 
3  Dennis  Deletant,  op.  cit.,  p.  40.  The  British  had  in  mind  establishing  and  Allied 
Commission  for  Control,  much  like  the  one  that  had  already  been  established  in  Italy, 
whereas the Soviets’ proposals were either frail (fight against Germany) or, in a somewhat 
obscure way, less favourable to the Romanian government (the taking over of the country by 
the Soviet army). Thus, the idea of an autonomous area where Soviet armies would not have 
access was overlooked.  ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                       Nr. 1/2005 
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moment, the Romanian group had been closely and specifically informed by the 
government in Bucharest about the behaviour of Soviet troops and their treatment of 
the civil and military authorities and of the civilians. Aware of the importance of 
Romania’s taking part in the war, the Romanian authorities would do their best to 
lay  as  soon  as  possible  the  foundations  of  a  future  co-operation  with  the 
commanding structures of the Red Army. To this end, the Romanian Department of 
Military  Structures  would  even  draw  up  a  document  called  Detailed  Norms  to 
ensure collaboration with the Soviet army
1. 
  Unfortunately,  with  the  signing  of  the  Truce  Convention  on  the  12
th  of 
September 1944, the subordination of the operative structures in the Romanian army 
became official; the first article read: all enterprise against Germany and Hungary 
undertaken  by  the  Romanian  army,  naval  and  air  forces  here  included,  will  be 
supervised by the Allied (Soviet) High Command
2. It was the Allied (Soviet) Control 
Commission, subject to the same Allied High Command, that had to supervise how 
the Truce provisions were brought into operation
3. 
  During truce negotiations, the government led by Stătescu took a firm stand 
on the issue of war prisoners and deported persons; before leaving for Moscow, the 
members  of  the  Romanian  delegation  were  thoroughly  instructed  to  take  all 
necessary steps towards their release. 
  On the 28
th of August, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Grigore Niculescu-
Buzeşti let the Romanian Legation in Ankara know that the Romanian government 
was  pleased  to  receive  the  official  acknowledgement  of  the  statement  made  by 
Molotov on the 25
th of August, but its observance was conditioned by the following: 
Romanian  troops  should  no  longer  be  disarmed,  whereas  the  troops  that  had 
already been disarmed should be armed again and placed at the disposal of the 
Romanian  government  to  take  action  against  Germany
4.  The  directives  of  the 
Romanian minister also had in view the Romanian fleet in Constanta. But on the 1
st 
of September the problem was still unsolved, at which point the Romanian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the same Legation in Ankara and let them 
                                                            
1 Archives of the Defence Department, fund 948, file 856, p. 124  
2 The complete text of the Truce Convention in România, marele sacrificat…, op. cit. pp. 
311-314. 
3 In fact, by resorting to the text of the convention and by enjoying almost complete control 
of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, the Soviets would try to get total control over the 
internal political situation, claiming that they wanted to secure peace and order beyond the 
front. They were practically free to take any course of action they wanted, as long as they 
could loosely interpret and bring into operation the Truce provisions. 
4 Archives of the Defence Department, fund 71/1920-1944, Turkey, Telegrams, Ankara, pp. 
134-135 ŒCONOMICA 
 
  113
know about the occupation regime set up by the Red Army and the fact that there 
had  been  delays  in  establishing  direct  contact  with  the  Soviet  commanding 
structures
1. 
  As for the condition of the Romanian troops, it was mentioned the fact that 
the disarming process was not as extensive as before, but it was still going on, 
pointing  out  that  the  measures  taken  by  the  Red  Army  could  only  damage  the 
country’s  sovereignty  and  independence
2.  The  topic  would  occur  over  and  over 
again in the newspapers the authorities in Bucharest would send to the Romanian 
delegation.  As  they  kept  presenting  how  difficult  was  for  them  to  efficiently 
communicate with the commanding structures of the Soviet armies which had set up 
an  occupational  regime,  the  Romanian  government  would  also  try  to  bring  to 
attention again their desire that every effort should be made in order to respect the 
Soviet statement made on the 25
th of August. They insisted upon the important part 
played by the Romanian army on the 23
rd of August, thus asking for another major 
problem to be solved: the release of the Romanian military who had been captured 
on the front in Moldova after the 23
rd of August and who were now essential and 
could  be  sent  to  fight  back  German  and  Hungarian  troops  that  were  preparing 
offensive attack. Nobody doubted the Red Army’s operational skills, but the return 
of the Romanian military was likely to further stimulate and raise the spirits of 
Romanian  soldiers  and  officers;  thus,  Romania  could  take  a  more  active  and 
efficient  part  in  the  cause  of  the  United  Nations.  As  for  the  disarmament  of 
Romanian troops, mention was made of the fact that an agreement had been reached 
with General Tolbukin, who declared that disarmament would never be heard of 
again. Unfortunately, Romanian authorities had been informed that the disarming 
process had not come to an end; it was still going on, especially in some areas in 
Muntenia.  Therefore,  the  Romanian  government  was  confident  that  all  these 
problems would be dealt with upon the signing of the Truce documents 
3– an event 
which kept being postponed. 
  The commanding structures of the Romanian army, that is the Romanian 
Department of Military Structures and its head, General Gheorghe Mihail were to 
pay  special  attention  to  this  problem  and  to  take  the  course  of  action  that  the 
Romanian  party  had  hoped  for,  shortly  after the  23
rd  of  August. Their  will was 
voiced  by  their  representative  in  the  Romanian  delegation,  General  Dumitru 
                                                            
1 Ibidem, vol. VIII, p. 186 
2 Ibidem. Obviously, the specification was nothing more but a reiteration of what had been 
stated in the telegram sent on the 28
th  of August: the problems and the solutions envisaged 
were much the same. 
3 Ibidem, p. 241 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                       Nr. 1/2005 
 
  114 
Dămăceanu, who brought up the difficult situation of the Romanian troops that had 
been prevented from leaving the concentration camps in Moldova
1. At some point 
previous to the signing of the truce convention
2, in an attempt to synthesise the steps 
taken towards the Soviet military authorities, the Department of Military Structures 
would let all Romanian military know that all efforts had been made towards the 
release of the officers and of the troop that had been disarmed and were arbitrarily 
held hostages by the Soviets
3. 
The arrival of the Romanian delegation at Moscow did not automatically 
mean concluding the truce, the content of which was only presented as final text on 
the 10
th of September 1944. The delay can hardly be accounted for and it resulted in 
the Convention being signed on the 12
th of September. During Truce negotiations, 
the Romanian party brought up again the problem of Romanian war prisoners taken 
by  the  Red  Army  on  the  front  in  Moldova.  On  behalf  of  the  government  in 
Bucharest, the delegation requested that the disarming by the Red Army cease and 
they  justified  their  request  by  stating  that  on  the  24
th  of  August,  at  4  a.m.,  the 
Romanian Department of Military Structures had put an end to warfare against the 
Soviet army, and the official state of war had been made public by the Romanian 
government on the 25
th of August
4. 
  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Truce  had  not  yet  been  signed,  Romanian 
representatives felt that Romanian troops were entitled to their armament, as they 
were actively taking part in fighting against Germany. The common cause could not 
be  supported  by  disarming  and  confining  Romanian  soldiers  and  officers, 
consequently, it was essential that Romanian armies that had been disarmed to be 
armed again as soon as possible to enable them to take action against Germany
5. 
The Romanian party also took into account the officers and crew in the Danube 
Delta  and  on  the  Black  Sea  which  were  forced  to  surrender  by  an  ultimatum 
delivered by the commanding structures of the Soviet fleet
6. 
  By supporting with arguments the proposals made by the Romanian party, 
the Romanian military representative, General Dumitru Dămăceanu, would insist 
                                                            
1 Archives of the Defence Department, fund M. St. M., section 3, file 2876, p 23. Dumitru 
Dămăceanu, who had just been promoted to the rank of general, had been instructed ever 
since the 27
th of August to ask for the Romanian troops to be sent to an unoccupied area. 
2 Ibidem, fund 948, file 1478, p. 244. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 205-206. 
4 This would have tremendous impact on the German troops, as General H. Friessner stated 
that German troops were in utter chaos. 
5 Apud Oşca, Al., Chiriţoiu, Mircea, Armistiţiu sau Dictat (Truce or Dictate) in R.I.M, no 
2/1995, p. 12. 
6 Ibidem  ŒCONOMICA 
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upon the precarious strategic condition of the Romanian army which, at the time, 
only had at its disposal one armed division, since the others were meant for inland 
and the ones that had been withdrawn from Moldova had been deprived of military 
equipment by the Soviet Union
1. Mention was also made of the body of troops 5, 6 
and 7 which had been disarmed by the Soviets after the 23
rd of August and it was 
suggested  that  the  armament  be  handed  back  in  order  to  provide  the  necessary 
equipment to the 12 Romanian divisions that were to leave for the West front, in 
keeping with the terms of the Truce Convention. 
  In the matter of the Romanian prisoners who had been in the Soviet Union 
from the beginning of the war to the moment when hostilities between the Romanian 
and  the  Russian  armies  ceased,  the  members  of  the  Romanian  delegation  had 
definite, clear suggestions to make. Although they admitted that the proposal was 
not intended as a commitment for the Soviet government to hand them back their 
arms,  the  Romanian  delegation  emphasised  that  if  this  happened,  it  could  only 
benefit the fight against Germany and it would help the Romanian party bring into 
more efficient operation the provisions of the Truce Convention
2. By declining, the 
Soviet  party  would  thus  state  that  the  problem  is  within  the  scope  of  military 
technicians,  of  little  present  interest,  despite  the  urge  voiced  by  the  Romanian 
representatives.  
  By  going  over  V.  M.  Molotov’s  conversational  notes  on  receiving  the 
Romanian  delegation  on  the  occasion  of  the  truce  being  concluded,  one  thing 
becomes transparent: the Soviet party was well aware of the fact that Romanian 
military  were  prepared  to  start  solving  military  problems.  This  argument  was 
rejected by the Soviet representative, who argued that the war had been going on for 
three years, and now they only needed a few weeks to move on and embrace the new 
conditions
3.  The  Soviet  high  official  also  stated  that,  for  military  reasons,  the 
proposals made by the Romanian delegation would only be analysed and dealt with 
in accordance with the extent to which the Romanian government would become 
                                                            
1 Further reference The Shorthand Report of the sessions to conclude the truce between the 
Allied Powers and Romania, in România, marele sacrificat,  pp. 297-309  
2 The issue of repatriating or of releasing the Romanian military captured by the Soviets 
either before or after the 23
rd of August was not to be taken up, in terms of international law, 
before the Peace Conference in Paris in February 1947, whereas Romania was bound by 
convention to set free all the allied prisoners captured by the Romanian army. The Soviet 
Union would show no benevolence until after the 6
th of March 1945, when the government 
led by Petru Groza and controlled by the Communists came to power. 
3 Misiunile lui A. I. Vâşinski, Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 
1997, p. 66. ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                       Nr. 1/2005 
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involved in the war against Germany
1. Obviously, during negotiation, that kind of 
statement  on  behalf  of  the  Soviet  party  could  only  provide  them  with  more 
opportunities to blackmail the Romanian party by consistently delaying a resolution 
in keeping with the terms of the truce that was to be concluded, that is sine die. 
  The  return  home  of  the  Romanian  delegation,  after  the  Truce  had  been 
concluded, would bring about controversy, both within the Council of Ministers and 
within  political  parties.  Whereas  the  Communist  Party  showed  gratitude  for  the 
“generous” offers made to Romania, the leaders of historical parties were extremely 
sceptical about how the provisions of the Truce Convention would be applied and 
interpreted by the Soviets
2.  
  During  the  encounters  between  the  representatives  of  the  Romanian 
delegation with members of the government, General Dumitru Dămăceanu was to 
confirm  that  he  had  taken  particular  interest  in  the  matter  of  Romanian  war 
prisoners. His proposals envisaged grouping them into two: on the one hand, the 
prisoners taken between the 22
nd of June 1941 and the 24
th of August 1944, on the 
other hand, the prisoners were taken after the 24
th of August, 4 a.m. The demands 
made by the Romanian military man included releasing in the shortest time possible 
the Romanian prisoners taken before the 23
rd of August and then handing back all 
Romanian  units  and  formations  alongside  with  their  equipment  and  ammunition 
dumps, including the war ships on the Danube and the Black Sea, that had been 
captured and disarmed after the 24
th of August, 4 a.m.
3 The answers the Romanian 
military man received from the homologous parts as representatives of the Allies 
suggested, once again, that the problem was to be solved in accordance with the 
military  co-operation  and  assistance  Romania  would  offer  against  German  and 
Hungarian  forces
4.  Consequently,  the  Truce  Convention  would  stipulate  nothing 
about the condition of Romanian war prisoners who were kept in camps by the 
Soviet Union; mention was only made of releasing the allied prisoners taken by the 
Romanian army. The only part the Convention played was that of wearing away the 
effects of the coup d’Etat on the 23
rd of August 1944 which posed serious threats to 
Kremlin’s intentions about Romania’s post-war status. 
                                                            
1 Ibidem. At the time, the Romanian government had already become entirely involved in the 
fight against German troops which had not left the country, paving the way for the Red 
Army, whereas the latter was disarming and preventing Romanian soldiers from leaving the 
camps along the frontline, despite their having ceased hostilities. 
2 Further reference, the shorthand reports of the Council of Ministers on the 1
st and on the 
16
th of September 1944, on concluding the Truce Convention. 
3 Futher reference R.I.M., Al. Duţu, op. cit. p. 47 
4 Ibidem  ŒCONOMICA 
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  The  controversy  between  Romanian  representatives  and  Soviet 
representatives  within  the  Allied  (Soviet)  Control  Commission  would  only 
emphasise that neither party trusted that it was possible to solve the problems raised 
by the interpretation and the application of the text of the Truce Convention. 
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